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ABSTRACT
In 1983 and 1986, the International Advertising
Association (IAA) published an original version and then a
revision of a report entitled ‘‘Tobacco Advertising Bans and
Consumption in 16 Countries,’’ which were edited by J J
Boddewyn, a marketing professor. The reports concluded
that tobacco advertising bans have not been accom-
panied by any significant reduction in tobacco consump-
tion. Opponents of tobacco advertising restrictions
trumpeted the IAA reports in print materials, media
communications and legislative hearings during the 1980s
and beyond. A new analysis of tobacco industry
documents and transcripts of tobacco litigation testimony
reveals that British American Tobacco ghost-wrote the
IAA reports and that the Tobacco Institute (the trade
association then representing the major US cigarette
manufacturers) helped to arrange for Boddewyn to
present the findings to the US Congress and the media.
Further research on tobacco industry documents and
tobacco litigation transcripts should assess whether
tobacco industry sources were responsible for ghost-
writing other studies favourable to the industry.
In October 1983 and April 1986, the International
Advertising Association (IAA) published an original
version and then a revision of a report entitled
‘‘Tobacco Advertising Bans and Consumption in
16 Countries’’.
12 It presented data on trends in
cigarette consumption in eight Centrally Planned
Economies that had no tobacco advertising, and in
eight Free Market Economies, seven of which had
banned tobacco advertising. The report concluded
‘‘There is no evidence from those countries where
tobacco advertising has been banned, that the ban
has been accompanied by any significant reduction
in overall consumption, per-capita consumption or
the incidence of smoking.’’
12
The cover of the report (fig 1) attributes the
‘‘Introduction and Editing’’ to Professor J J
Boddewyn, a professor of marketing/international
business at Baruch College, City University of New
York. The preface to the 1986 edition states ‘‘The
I.A.A. selected Professor Boddewyn to write the
Introduction and edit this report because of his
numerous works for the I.A.A. on advertising
regulations.’’
2 The preface goes on to state ‘‘The
report was prepared by and from industry sources,
using data assembled from official and trade
organizations.’’
2 However, the report provides no
further information on who conducted the ana-
lyses and wrote the text. Thus, the IAA publication
links the 16-country study to the IAA itself, to
Boddewyn and to ‘‘industry sources’’, but it is
unclear whether ‘‘industry’’ refers to the advertis-
ing or tobacco industry.
A connection between Boddewyn and the
tobacco industry has been known for many years,
but a new analysis of tobacco industry documents
and transcripts of tobacco litigation testimony
reveals a more complete picture of their associa-
tion. In fact, it shows that British American
Tobacco (BAT) ghost-wrote the IAA’s reports on
the 16-country study and that the Tobacco
Institute (the trade association then representing
the major US cigarette manufacturers) helped to
arrange for Boddewyn to present the findings to
the US Congress and the media.
SOURCES OF DATA
Relevant transcripts of tobacco litigation testi-
mony were found during a study of testimony on
tobacco advertising and promotion as part of the
Tobacco Deposition and Trial Testimony Archive
(Tobacco DATTA) project. Details on the methods
used in that project and study are available
elsewhere.
34 In addition, the Legacy Tobacco
Documents Library (http://legacy.library.ucsf.
edu/) was searched in May 2007 using
‘‘Boddewyn’’ as the search term, and a list of
3304 documents was returned. Only the first 200
of these documents were reviewed because most of
the last 50 of these documents were duplicates of
earlier documents or were not relevant to this
inquiry. More selective searches of the Legacy
collection were conducted to find documents
related to those identified in the initial search.
GHOST-WRITING THE IAA REPORTS
In the transcript of testimony by Michael
Waterson (a tobacco industry consultant) in
litigation over Canada’s national tobacco control
act of 1997,
5 the following exchange occurs with
Maurice Regnier, an attorney representing the
Canadian Justice Department:
Question (Regnier): ‘‘When we were reviewing
… the document by Infotab, which was not filed
[in the court’s public record], you mentioned that
… you had knowledge of a work by Boddewyn
titled ‘Tobacco Advertising Bans and Consumption in
16 Countries’, that’s correct?’’
Answer (Waterson): ‘‘I said I thought I had a
memory of it, yes, that’s correct.’’
Q: ‘‘Did you know that this paper by Mr.
Boddewyn was in fact ghost-written by Mr. Paul
Bingham from British American Tobacco?’’
A: ‘‘I had no idea. I may have seen it.… I had no
idea whether one person wrote it or another.’’
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through Mr. Jean-Paul Blais’ discovery.… It was already filed in
the record, My Lord. It is document … ITL-124.… This
document is signed by Mr. Paul Bingham. The third paragraph
reads:
‘You already have the IAA booklet by Boddewyn, which I ghost-wrote
for him in nineteen eighty-six (1986). Although I cannot update this for
you instantly, I gave you incidence of smoking numbers, as requested,
for some of the countries that had bans.’
Do you have any knowledge, in view of this statement by Mr.
Bingham, that Mr. Boddewyn’s booklet was ghost-written by
Mr. Bingham?’’
A: ‘‘I have simply … no knowledge of this at all.’’ (italics in
original)
Regnier then asks the court to file the ITL-124 document
(enter it into the court’s public record), but Simon Potter, an
attorney for the Imperial Tobacco Company, objects on the
basis that the document ‘‘was filed during a discovery under une
ordonnance de confidentialite ´, pour des raisons commerciales [a
confidentiality order, for commercial reasons].’’
Although the aforementioned document is not publicly
available (Rob Cunningham, Canadian Cancer Society, personal
communication, 13 July 2006), other industry documents that
are available confirm that Bingham ghost-wrote both the 1983
and 1986 versions of the IAA report. One such document,
6 from
1983, was in the collection of the Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corporation, formerly a subsidiary of BAT. It is entitled ‘‘Report
from the Secretariat,’’ presumably referring to the secretariat of
the industry’s International Tobacco Information Centre
(INFOTAB).
7 This document states that ‘‘Further meetings
have been held and final arrangements made with Professor Jean
Boddewyn and the N.Y. office of the I.A.A. for the monograph
on advertising bans and their effects to be published as soon as
possible.’’
6 This update appears under the heading ‘‘Bingham
Paper.’’
According to an INFOTAB memo
8 dated 30 January 1986,
entitled ‘‘16 Bans Booklet’’:
‘‘[W]e have just received the updated manuscript from Paul
Bingham of BAT Milbank, including figures for 1983 and 1984,
which continue to support the basic position.… We are in touch
with the IAA and plan to have the updated booklet available just
as soon as possible. Our thanks go again to Paul Bingham and
BAT for putting together the data. This has proved to be an
invaluable item in the advertising debate and much used in our
outlets.’’
In an apparent handout for a presentation at an INFOTAB
workshop held on 12–15 October 1987 in Washington, DC,
Boddewyn refers to ‘‘the INFOTAB’s study of Advertising Bans
in 16 Countries (published by the International Advertising
Association).’’
9
In summary, the 1983 and 1986 reports were ghost-written
by Paul Bingham of BAT, published by IAA, edited by
Boddewyn, and then attributed by Boddewyn to INFOTAB.
PUBLICISING THE IAA REPORTS
Opponents of tobacco advertising restrictions trumpeted the
IAA reports in print materials, media communications and
legislative hearings during the 1980s and beyond. For instance,
Boddewyn highlighted the results of the 16-country study in
hearings before the US House of Representatives in 1986, 1987
and 1989.
10–12 A Tobacco Institute (TI) memorandum distrib-
uted internally before the 1989 hearing indicates that the TI
requested that Boddewyn and three other university-based
‘‘experts’’ be invited to testify.
13 Another internal TI memo—
distributed after the hearing—summarises the hearing, men-
tions Boddewyn’s testimony about the 16-country study and
indicates that Boddewyn was one of two witnesses on the
fourth panel ‘‘testifying on behalf of the industry.’’
14 The memo
also states that media coverage of the hearing was ‘‘moderate’’
and that ‘‘Tobacco Institute public affairs staff was on hand to
promote the industry’s positions with the press, and to facilitate
interviews with experts.’’
14
Interestingly, in the ‘‘Editor’s introduction’’ in the 1986
edition of the IAA report, Boddewyn cites the publicity
surrounding the original (1983) report as a reason for revising
and republishing it: ‘‘Since the first edition of this study has
Figure 1 The cover of the International Advertising Association’s 1983
report on tobacco advertising bans and consumption in 16 countries,
which was ghost-written by British American Tobacco.
What this paper adds
c The 1983 and 1986 reports on the International Advertising
Association’s 16-country study on tobacco advertising bans
were edited by J J Boddewyn, a marketing professor, and
were cited extensively in opposition to tobacco advertising
restrictions.
c A connection between Boddewyn and the tobacco industry
has been known for many years, but this analysis of tobacco
industry documents and transcripts of tobacco litigation
testimony provides a more complete picture of their
association and reveals that British American Tobacco ghost-
wrote the IAA reports.
c The documents also show that the Tobacco Institute (the trade
association then representing the major US cigarette
manufacturers) helped to arrange for Boddewyn to present the
IAA’s findings to the US Congress and the media.
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discussions and governmental hearings, it was thought appro-
priate to update it to 1984.’’
2
CONNECTIONS BETWEEN BODDEWYN AND THE TOBACCO
INDUSTRY
Boddewyn did not disclose his personal affiliation with the
tobacco industry in the IAA’s 1983 and 1986 reports. However,
in a 1989 report from the IAA on a study of children’s self-
reported reasons for starting to smoke, Boddewyn did acknowl-
edge that he ‘‘was asked by INFOTAB, the tobacco industry’s
international information centre, and by the International
Advertising Association, to edit this report, and to comment
on its validity and significance’’.
15 i In an article published in
1989 in the British Journal of Addiction (now called Addiction),
Boddewyn confessed ‘‘I am biased because I have served as a
paid expert witness for the tobacco industry in the United
States and Canada.’’
18
A search of documents in the Legacy Tobacco Documents
Library (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/) shows myriad connec-
tions between Boddewyn and the tobacco industry. For
example, an internal Philip Morris memorandum requests a
$6000 payment to Boddewyn for the preparation of a 25–50-
page report that would, among other things, ‘‘discuss and refute
claims that Marlboro marketing activities are aimed at
children.’’
19 That memo also requested ‘‘Payment of expenses
for attending hearings, etc.’’ For a fee of $10 000 plus travel
expenses (including business-class airfare), Boddewyn agreed to
testify before the Social Services Select Committee for the
Tobacco Institute of New Zealand. That institute wrote to
Philip Morris and thanked the company for agreeing to cover
that funding, but indicated that Boddewyn ‘‘will be in New
Zealand at the invitation of the Newpaper Publishers
Association of New Zealand.’’
20 21
Joossens cited a paper presented by Boddewyn in March 1988
to Belgian journalists who were invited to Washington, DC, by
the Belgian tobacco industry.
22 The Secretary General of
INFOTAB claimed to have arranged for Boddewyn to be a
tobacco industry witness at a January 1985 hearing in Hong
Kong on proposed restrictions of tobacco advertising in broad-
cast media.
23 Boddewyn reportedly also attended BAT media
seminars in 1992 and 1993 in Bali, South Africa and Sri Lanka.
24
On 14–15 September 1987, the US Tobacco Institute held its
15th College of Tobacco Knowledge in Washington, DC, for
‘‘our friends in the tobacco family.’’ Memoranda for this event
indicated that the college ‘‘will focus on the issues most
important to the industry … with the Public Affairs Division
issues team coordinating sessions that highlight our most
effective arguments, experts, allies and other resources.’’
Registration was limited to 75 people. Boddewyn was one of
four speakers listed on the agenda for the session on
‘‘Advertising Restrictions,’’ which was moderated by Frederick
Panzer, vice president of the Tobacco Institute.
25–27 Boddewyn
was a speaker on a similar panel at the institute’s September
1988 College of Tobacco Knowledge,
28 29 whose attendees
included a diverse mix of people from cigarette companies, the
Tobacco Institute and advertising and public relations firms.
30
The Tobacco Institute’s collection of documents includes a
copy of a letter from the editor of the British Journal of Addiction
to Boddewyn, about peer-review comments for a manuscript
that Boddewyn had submitted to the journal.
31 A manuscript
written by Boddewyn, perhaps the same as that mentioned in
the preceding sentence, is also found in the institute’s files, with
a scribbled note on the cover page from ‘‘Jean’’ (Boddewyn) to
‘‘Fred’’ (presumable Panzer).
32 The existence of these notes and
materials in the institute’s files suggests collaboration between
Boddewyn and the tobacco industry in his publication activities.
Confirmation of that collaboration comes from a handwritten
note from Boddewyn to Jean Besques (of Philip Morris in
Lausanne, Switzerland), asking for suggestions on revisions to
the manuscript he submitted to the British Journal of Addiction.
33
In a briefing paper based on material in the Minnesota
depository of tobacco industry documents, Hirschhorn pre-
sented other evidence indicating a connection between
Boddewyn and the tobacco industry.
24
FLAWS IN THE IAA REPORTS
The IAA study published in 1983 and 1986 presented descriptive
data on tobacco consumption for 16 countries, all but one of
which prohibited tobacco advertising. The study found that
‘‘advertising bans have not been followed by significant changes
in tobacco consumption.’’ Boddewyn, in his ‘‘Editor’s introduc-
tion,’’ concluded that tobacco advertising bans are ‘‘deplorable’’
because ‘‘they appear to be unrelated, in the short or medium
term, to overall tobacco consumption’’ and ‘‘they also tend to
prevent or hamper the spreading of information about new
features such as filtered and lower tar cigarettes.’’
1
A major flaw in Boddewyn’s reasoning is that tobacco
consumption might have been higher in these countries if
tobacco advertising had been allowed—a possibility acknowl-
edged by Boddewyn in his testimony before Congress in 1986.
10
But in that same testimony, he conjures up the ‘‘straw man’’
premise that tobacco advertising is the only factor purported to
affect tobacco use in the population, and then he cites IAA data
to knock down that straw man. Boddewyn, for example, argues
repeatedly that ‘‘factors other than advertising are at work’’.
10
However, experts in tobacco tobacco do not argue that
advertising is the only factor, or even the main factor, in
determining patterns of tobacco use in the population. Instead,
most of them assert that it is one of several factors that influence
tobacco consumption.
To assess the independent effect of one of those factors on
tobacco consumption, studies must be designed so as to take
into account other factors associated with tobacco use. The IAA
study did not include any other controls on tobacco demand
such as tobacco price or income. Because changes in price and
income can have a larger effect on tobacco demand than
advertising bans, the failure to control for these variables makes
it impossible to determine the effect of tobacco advertising bans
from the IAA study.
34
Saffer and Chaloupka, on the other hand, in a study of the
effects of tobacco advertising restrictions on tobacco consumption
in 22 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries, controlled for several correlates of tobacco use
iThe IAA’s 1989 report indicates that children aged 7–16 years were much more likely
to attribute their smoking initiation to personal curiousity (‘‘to see what it was like’’)
and family and peer influences than to cigarette advertising. In his ‘‘Editor’s
introduction,’’ Boddewyn comments that this study ‘‘breaks new methodological
ground … [and] provides strong evidence that advertising plays a negligible role in the
initiation of smoking by the young’’.
15 However, as noted in the US Surgeon General’s
1989 report on smoking and health, marketing experts question the validityo f
smokers’ assessments of the influence of advertising on their smoking behaviour
because ‘‘conscious response to advertising is deemed to be a poor index of actual
response’’.
16 Chapman points out additional flaws in the study, one of which was that
the survey questions seemed designed so as to minimise the respondents’ likelihood
of identifying cigarette advertising as a factor in their smoking: children in the study
were asked to name ‘‘the most important reason’’ why they smoked their first
cigarette.
17
Special communication
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35 They found that
comprehensive tobacco advertising bans can reduce tobacco
consumption, but that partial advertising bans have little or no
effect on consumption (because the latter permit a shift of
marketing expenditures from ‘‘banned’’ media to ‘‘allowed’’
media).
CONCLUSIONS
Despite major flaws in the IAA’s 16-country study, it was cited
prominently by opponents of tobacco advertising bans in the
1980s and 1990s. Unfortunately BAT’s role in ghost-writing the
IAA’s 1983 and 1986 reports was not known during that time,
and has only now come to light—more than two decades after
their initial publication. Boddewyn’s written statement to
Congress in 1989 did acknowledge in a footnote that the 16-
country study ‘‘was financed by the tobacco industry,’’
12 but
that disclosure did not appear in the IAA’s 1983 and 1986
reports. Further research on tobacco industry documents and
tobacco litigation transcripts should assess whether tobacco
industry sources were responsible for ghost-writing other
studies favourable to the industry.
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